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      PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
    
 
No. 13-4458 
    
 
 
COLUMBIA GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC, 
                                                  Appellant 
 
v. 
 
1.01 ACRES, MORE OR LESS IN PENN TOWNSHIP,  
YORK COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA, LOCATED ON  
TAX ID# 440002800150000000 OWNED BY  
DWAYNE P. BROWN AND ANN M. BROWN;  
DWAYNE P. BROWN; ANN M. BROWN  
 
 
    
 
No. 13-4459 
    
 
 
COLUMBIA GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC, 
                                                  Appellant 
 
v. 
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101 ACRES, AND 41,342 SQ. FT MORE OR LESS IN 
HEIDELBERG TOWNSHIP,  
YORK COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA, LOCATED ON TAX 
ID #30000EE1600000000, OWNED BY BRADLEY E. 
HERR AND ELIZABETH M. HERR; BRADLEY E. HERR; 
ELIZABETH M. HERR  
 
 
 
    
 
No. 13-4460 
    
 
 
COLUMBIA GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC, 
                                                  Appellant 
 
v. 
 
1.5561 ACRES, MORE OR LESS IN  
HEIDELBERG TOWNSHIP, 
YORK COUNTY PENNSYLVANIA, LOCATED ON TAX 
ID #30000ED010300000000, OWNED BY MYRON A. 
HERR AND MARY JO HERR;  
MYRON A. HERR; MARY JO HERR  
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No. 13-4461 
    
 
COLUMBIA GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC,  
    Appellant 
v. 
1.010 ACRES, MORE OR LESS IN PENN TOWNSHIP,  
YORK COUNTY PENNSYLVANIA, LOCATED ON TAX 
ID #440002800240000000, OWNED BY DOUGLAS W. 
HILYARD AND TESSA J. HILYARD; DOUGLAS W. 
HILYARD; TESSA J. HILYARD  
 
      
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(Nos.:  4-13-cv-00778; 4-13-cv-00783; 
4-13-cv-00785 and 4-13-cv-00786) 
District Judge:  Honorable Matthew W. Brann 
      
Argued on July 9, 2014 
 
Before:  RENDELL, CHAGARES and JORDAN,  
Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: September 26, 2014) 
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O P I N I O N 
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
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 The issue before us is straightforward: does Columbia 
Gas Transmission, LLC (“Columbia”), have the right of 
eminent domain to obtain easements over the land of 
objecting landowners, outside of the existing right of way, in 
order to replace deteriorating pipeline? The answer is equally 
straightforward and clear: yes.  
 
 The regulatory authority given to natural gas 
companies such as Columbia actually anticipates replacement 
outside the existing right of way as we discuss below, and 
contains no adjacency requirement. The issue before us, then, 
whether Columbia has a right to replace the pipeline outside 
of the existing right of way, is actually a non-issue. But, the 
District Court put a peculiar “spin” on the regulations in 
question, finding them to be ambiguous by adopting its own 
definition of “replace” and concluding that a “notice” of 
“proposed rulemaking” for “Emergency Reconstruction of 
Interstate Natural Gas Facilities” promulgated by the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) after 9/11 should 
somehow be viewed as resolving this ambiguity in the law.  
Our dissenting colleague adopts this argument.  However, we 
suggest that the statute and regulations are clear and the case 
before us is easily resolved. 
 
 Columbia, an interstate natural gas company subject to 
the jurisdiction of FERC, seeks to replace a portion of a 
natural gas pipeline (“Line 1655”) that runs in and around 
York County, Pennsylvania. Because the original location of 
the pipeline has become heavily populated, the replacement 
will not track the original line but instead will be outside the 
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existing right of way. (App. 27.)1 In an effort to obtain 
easements necessary to complete construction of the 
replacement, in March 2013, Columbia filed Complaints in 
Condemnation against four landowning couples (the 
“Landowners”) in federal court. In May 2013, Columbia filed 
motions for partial summary judgment and for preliminary 
injunctions to acquire immediate possession of the easements. 
In June 2013, the Landowners also filed motions for summary 
judgment. The District Court subsequently denied Columbia’s 
motions and granted the Landowners’ motions, holding that 
Columbia did not have the right of eminent domain required 
to condemn the easements. The District Court’s conclusion 
rested on the determination that the relevant FERC regulation, 
18 C.F.R. § 157.202(b)(2)(i), was ambiguous. As a result, the 
Court looked outside the regulations to a sentence in a notice 
of proposed rulemaking that it concluded set forth the agency 
interpretation. This was a mistake. The language of the 
governing regulations could not be more clear. For the 
reasons set forth below, we will reverse the judgments of the 
District Court.2  
                                              
1 The District Court stated that the replacement pipeline 
would be one quarter of a mile from the original but the 
Landowners counter that the replacement pipeline will be “up 
to a mile away.” (App. 15.) The actual distance between the 
replacement pipeline and the existing pipeline is not clear 
from the record, but because using the greater distance does 
not change our position with respect to the appeal, we will 
assume that it is correct.  
2 Columbia also appeals the judgment of the District Court 
with respect to a motion for reconsideration (or a “motion to 
alter”) it filed on December 13, 2013. Because we will 
reverse the District Court on the motions for summary 
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I. Background 
 
 Line 1655 is over fifty years old, and Columbia asserts 
that portions of the pipeline must be replaced to meet safety 
standards established by the Pipeline and Hazardous 
Materials Safety Administration. Columbia has already 
replaced 19,000 feet — or 95% — of the pipeline but has 
been stalled in replacing the last 1,000 feet because it lacks 
the remaining necessary easements — that is, the easements 
on and across the Landowners’ properties. Columbia 
attempted to obtain these easements through negotiation, as it 
had the others it needed, but was unsuccessful.3 Accordingly, 
Columbia filed a complaint in the District Court, seeking 
condemnation of the remaining easements to which it was 
entitled pursuant to the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h). 
Before addressing the District Court’s disposition of the case, 
we will set forth the statutory scheme that underpins 
Columbia’s entitlement to the easements.  
A. Statutory Scheme 
 
 The Natural Gas Act provides: 
 
When any holder of a certificate of public 
convenience and necessity cannot acquire by 
                                                                                                     
judgment, the appeal of the order concerning the motion for 
reconsideration will be moot.  
3 The Dissent makes the claim that Columbia “threatened” the 
Landowners. (Dissent. Op. at 3.) This is a sensationalist 
reading of Columbia’s statement that its offers were higher 
than the fair market value of the land, and has no basis in the 
record.  
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contract, or is unable to agree with the owner of 
property to the compensation to be paid for, the 
necessary right-of-way to construct, operate, 
and maintain a pipe line or pipe lines for the 
transportation of natural gas . . . it may acquire 
the same by the exercise of the right of eminent 
domain in the district court of the United States 
for the district in which such property may be 
located, or in the State courts. 
 
15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (emphasis added). Accordingly, a 
certificate of public convenience and necessity gives its 
holder the ability to obtain automatically the necessary right 
of way through eminent domain, with the only open issue 
being the compensation the landowner defendant will receive 
in return for the easement. In 1983, FERC issued a blanket 
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (the “FERC 
Certificate”) to Columbia that covers Line 1655. Columbia’s 
FERC Certificate states that Columbia is “authorized to 
conduct many routine activities and abandon facilities and 
service on a self-implementing basis without further 
authorization by the Commission.” (App. 104.) (emphasis 
added) In defining “routine activities,” the Certificate 
references 18 C.F.R. § 157.203(b). This regulation provides 
that blanket certificate holders have automatic authorization 
to engage in transactions described in certain other 
provisions, including 18 C.F.R. § 157.208(a), which states, in 
relevant part: 
 
If the project cost does not exceed the cost 
limitations set forth in column 1 of Table I, 
under paragraph (d) of this section, or if the 
project is required to restore service in an 
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emergency, the certificate holder is authorized 
to make miscellaneous rearrangements of any 
facility, or acquire, construct, replace, or 
operate any eligible facility.  
 
18 C.F.R. § 157.208(a) (emphasis added). Costs limitations 
are not an issue in this case.4  Thus, if Columbia is replacing 
an “eligible facility,” this constitutes a “routine activity” and 
Columbia can conduct this activity on a “self-implementing 
basis without further authorization by the Commission.” 
(App. 104.)5   
                                              
4 As relevant here, gas companies holding a certificate, 
relying on Section 157, must provide notice to FERC and an 
environmental impact statement for any replacement 
construction project, unless the costs are less than $11 
million.  18 C.F.R. § 157.208(a)-(b), (d).  Columbia had 
originally budgeted the replacement for Line 1655 at $10.6 
million, but encountered additional costs in the form of 
condemnation proceedings.  (App. 1412-13.)  Accordingly, 
Columbia requested a waiver of the $11 million cost cap from 
FERC.  The agency concluded that: “[I]t appears that 
Columbia made a good faith effort to construct the 
replacement project under the guidelines and cost limits set 
forth in section 157.208(d) of the Commission’s blanket 
certificate regulations. Based on the specific facts and 
circumstances of this project, waiver of cost limitations in this 
instance is granted.” (App. 1413.) 
5 The Dissent urges that some notice or process should 
accompany this type of activity by certificate holders, in order 
to avoid constitutional problems.  That argument is best made 
to Congress – or in the next case.  It has not been raised in the 
case before us.  
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 It is important to note that if Columbia Gas did not 
have a blanket certificate, and instead merely possessed a 
certificate of public convenience and necessity authorizing 
construction of a mainline, for instance, it would be able 
nonetheless to construct or extend facilities “which constitute 
the replacement of existing facilities that have or will soon 
become physically deteriorated or obsolete, to the extent that 
replacement is deemed advisable, if . . . [t]he replacement 
facilities . . . will be located in the same right-of-way or on 
the same site as the facilities being replaced . . . .” 18 C.F.R. § 
2.55(b)(1); 15 U.S.C. § 717(f)(c)(1)(A). This provision is an 
exemption that relieves natural gas companies from the 
requirement of having to obtain a certificate of public 
convenience and necessity. 
 
 However, with the instant blanket certificate of public 
convenience and necessity, authorizing routine activities on a 
self-implementing basis, Columbia is not limited to replacing 
within the same right of way, pursuant to Section 2.55(b).  
Instead, as noted above, it can engage in any routine activity 
without further authorization including generally “replac[ing] 
. . . any eligible facility.” 18 C.F.R. § 157.208(a). The issue 
becomes: is Columbia replacing an “eligible facility”?  If so, 
it needs no further authorization. 
Section 157.202(b)(2)(i) defines an “eligible facility” 
as including “main line, lateral, and compressor replacements 
that do not qualify under § 2.55(b) of this chapter because 
they will result in an incidental increase in the capacity of 
main line facilities, or because they will not satisfy the 
location or work space requirements of § 2.55(b).” Thus, by 
definition, this provision includes the replacement of facilities 
that cannot “be located in the same right-of-way or on the 
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same site as the facilities being replaced.” 18 C.F.R. § 
2.55(b)(ii). Accordingly, by their terms, Sections 157.203(b) 
and 157.208(a) specifically and automatically authorize the 
main line replacement at issue here as a routine activity in 
connection with an eligible facility that cannot be located in 
the same right of way or same site, which Columbia Gas has 
the right to “self-implement[]” without further authorization 
from FERC. (App. 104.) 
 
 Though not disputed here, even the right of blanket 
certificate holders to replace eligible facilities is not without 
limits.  The Dissent points out four such checks: a reporting 
requirement, a notice requirement, an environmental-impact-
statement requirement, and monetary restrictions.  (Dissent 
Op. at 27.)  
 
 Other curbs significantly restrict the nature of 
replacement projects.  Certificate holders may not construct 
new “delivery points” under the guise of replacement.  18 
C.F.R. § 157.202(b)(2)(ii)(E).  Also, in general, 
“Replacements for the primary purpose of creating additional 
main line capacity are not eligible facilities” under blanket 
certificate authority.  Id. § 157.202(b)(2)(i).  That is, 
“Replacements must be done for sound engineering 
purposes.” Id.  In clarifying this stricture, FERC 
“underscore[d]” that “there must be a physical need to replace 
facilities,” such that gas companies may not circumvent the 
general requirements for new pipeline construction simply by 
designating it “replacement.”  Revision Of Existing 
Regulations Under the Natural Gas Act, 64 Fed. Reg. 54522, 
54527 (Sept. 29, 1999) (codified at 18 C.F.R 157).  FERC 
also encourages the enforcement of such regulations through 
the filing of complaints against companies that falsely claim 
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the need to replace pipelines.  Id.  Again, none of these 
limitations are at issue here; Appellees do not challenge, for 
instance, that Line 1655 is being replaced for sound 
engineering reasons.  But the regulations ensure that gas 
companies do not possess unfettered discretion in 
constructing and siting replacement pipelines. 
 
B. The District Court’s Opinions 
 
 In October 2013, the District Court granted the 
Landowners’ motions for summary judgment, holding that 
Columbia did not have the right of eminent domain. The 
Court reached this conclusion by turning to one dictionary 
definition of the word “replace,” and using it to read an 
adjacency requirement into Part 157. In relevant part, the 
Court stated: 
 
Columbia Gas’s contention . . . is that its 
certificate automatically authorizes relocation of 
replacement Line 1655 literally anywhere on 
earth, so long as the replacement “will not 
satisfy the location or work space requirements 
of § 2.55(b).” But this interpretation of the 
regulations puts an excessively expansive gloss 
on the common meaning of “replace,” see 
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, 
Unabridged, s.v. “replace,” accessed October 
23, 2013, http://unabridged.merriam-
webster.com (“1: to place again: restore to a 
former place, position, or condition”), a term 
that generally does not imply significant 
relocation. Moreover, Columbia Gas’s 
interpretation is seemingly contrary to the 
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structure of the regulations, which equate the 
“relocation of existing facilities” with another 
defined term, “miscellaneous rearrangement,” 
see 18 C.F.R. § 157.202(b)(6), not with 
“replacement[],” see 18 C.F.R. § 
157.202(b)(2)(i). The meaning of “replacements 
that do not qualify under § 2.55(b),” is, at best, 
ambiguous as it relates to Columbia Gas’s 
replacement Line 1655. 
 
(App. 32-33.) Having created this ambiguity, the District 
Court turned to a notice of proposed rulemaking issued by 
FERC in 2003 in connection with emergency construction of 
natural gas pipelines after 9/11. The Court viewed the notice 
of proposed rulemaking as “a fairly definitive interpretation” 
of the replacement provision contained in Part 157. (App. 33.) 
 
 The notice was issued in order to “give pipeline 
companies greater flexibility to reconstruct pipelines during 
emergencies caused by ‘deliberate effort[s] to disrupt the flow 
of natural gas.’” (App. 33 (citations omitted).) It states, in 
pertinent part: 
 
[P]art 157, Subpart F, permits replacement 
construction that uses temporary workspace 
beyond the bounds of the temporary workspace 
previously used to construct the original 
facilities as necessary to install replacement 
facilities. These regulations also permit locating 
a portion of mainline, lateral, or compressor 
replacement facilities outside, but presumably 
adjacent to, an existing right-of-way where, for 
whatever reason, the new facilities could not be 
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placed entirely within the original facilities’ 
existing right-of-way. These regulations, 
however, do not appear to contemplate mainline 
construction over an entirely different route as 
may be necessary to circumvent the site of a 
disaster if immediate replacement is necessary 
before the original site is again available. 
 
Emergency Reconstruction of 
Interstate Natural Gas Facilities 
Under the Natural Gas Act, 68 
Fed. Reg. 4120, 4122 (proposed 
Jan. 17, 2003) (to be codified at 
18 C.F.R. 157) (emphasis added).6 
                                              
 6 The District Court also commented on other portions of the 
2003 notice regarding Part 157: 
 
The agency repeated this general 
idea a number of times: “part 157 
. . . does not permit the extensive 
deviation from an existing right-
of-way that would presumably be 
necessary to circumvent a 
restricted or quarantined area,” 
“[part 157] was broadened 
incrementally in 1999 to [allow] 
mainline replacements . . . that . . . 
did not lie within the original 
facilities’ footprint, and 
consequently were outside of the 
section 2.55(b) replacement 
parameters . . . [but] this 
15 
 
The District Court read the Notice 
as imposing an “adjacency” 
requirement onto any replacement 
of a pipeline made under Part 157. 
The Court then also determined 
that since the replacement 
pipeline would be “approximately 
a quarter-mile distant” from the 
existing pipeline and thus, did not 
                                                                                                     
modification in the breadth of 
eligible facilities did not 
contemplate the more extensive 
rerouting that would be required 
to reach around a cordoned 
accident area,” “[the 1999 
broadening of part 157] 
recognized the need to grant 
natural gas companies the 
flexibility to act under blanket 
certificate authority to replace 
facilities where construction of 
new facilities might spill over the 
original temporary workspace or 
permanent right-of-way . . . [but 
did not] envision[] replacement of 
facilities outside the existing 
right-of-way by the creation of an 
entirely new route due to the need 
to circumvent an accident site. 
 
(App. 34-35 (citations omitted).) 
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align with its definition of 
“replace” that required the same 
location, it could not “be properly 
characterized as [a] 
‘replace[ment]’ of an ‘eligible 
facility.’” (App. 36.)  
 
 On November 22, 2013, however, FERC issued a Final 
Rule implementing changes to certain portions of Part 157 of 
Title 18 of the CFR, which governs the instant case.7 The 
Final Rule included a footnote in which FERC identified a 
fact pattern essentially identical to the one at issue here — 
that is, whether a company can rely on its blanket certificate 
to replace the capacity of a segment of an obsolete pipeline 
with a new pipeline that may need to be located a 
considerable distance from the old pipeline. (See App. 1042.) 
In it, FERC specifically states that Part 157 allows for such 
replacement even where the replacement is not adjacent to an 
existing right of way:  
 
“[w]hile the Commission has 
indicated previously that it is 
contemplated that replacement 
facilities constructed under 
blanket authority would usually be 
located adjacent to, if not within, 
an existing right-of-way, sections 
157.202(b)(2)(1) and 157.210 
permit the construction of non-
                                              
7 This Final Rule has nothing to do with the Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking previously discussed that was referred 
to by the District Court.  
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main line facilities and main line 
facilities, respectively, without 
restriction on their location.”8 
                                              
8 In full, the footnote reads:  
 
We note that in instances where a pipeline 
company needs to rely on its Part 157 certificate 
to construct auxiliary or replacement facilities 
because they do not satisfy the location or work 
space limitations of section 2.55, the Part 157 
blanket certificate regulations impose no 
limitations on the placement of the facilities. 
While the Commission has indicated previously 
that it is contemplated that replacement 
facilities constructed under blanket authority 
would usually be located adjacent to, if not 
within, an existing right-of-way, sections 
157.202(b)(2)(1) and 157.210 permit the 
construction of non-main line facilities and 
main line facilities, respectively, without 
restriction on their location. For example, a 
company can rely on its Part 157 blanket 
certificate to replace the capacity of a segment 
of obsolete pipeline with new pipeline that may 
need to be located at considerable distance from 
the old pipeline in order to avoid a housing 
development constructed since the old pipeline 
was installed or to install auxiliary facilities 
such as anodes offset from the existing right-of-
way to provide cathodic protection. 
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Revisions to Auxiliary Installations, Replacement Facilities, 
and Siting and Maintenance Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 
72794, 72805 n.78 (Dec. 4, 2013) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. 
§§ 157 & 380) (emphasis added). Effectively, FERC 
repudiated the District Court’s interpretation of the regulation 
at issue. 
 
 On December 13, 2013, Columbia filed Rule 59(e) 
Motions to Alter the Judgment of the District Court based on 
FERC’s recently issued Final Rule. On May 20, 2014, the 
District Court denied Columbia’s Motions to Alter, holding 
that the footnote in FERC’s Final Rule was not entitled to 
deference under Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) 
(holding that deference is owed to an agency’s interpretation 
of its own ambiguous regulation). The District Court 
described FERC’s Final Rule as an “about-face” (App. 54) 
and explained that under Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham 
Corporation, it was not entitled to deference because it 
                                                                                                     
Revisions to Auxiliary Installations, Replacement Facilities, 
and Siting and Maintenance Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 
72794, 72805 n.78 (Dec. 4, 2013) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. 
§§ 157 & 380). The Dissent notes the promulgation of this 
Final Rule closely following the District Court’s decision as if 
this is problematic.  To the contrary, we view the Final Rule 
as FERC’s specific, reasonable rebuttal to what it viewed as a 
total misreading of the regulations governing its operation.  
See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 
2156, 2166-67 (2012) (noting that “Auer ordinarily calls for 
deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous 
regulation, even when that interpretation is advanced in a 
legal brief . . . .”). 
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conflicted with FERC’s prior interpretation of Part 157, as set 
forth in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, and therefore did 
“not reflect the fair and considered judgment of the agency.” 
(App. 56); see also Christopher, 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2166 (2012) 
(Auer deference does not apply where “there is reason to 
suspect that the agency’s interpretation does not reflect the 
agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter in 
question,” such as where “the agency’s interpretation 
conflicts with a prior interpretation”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Consequently, the District Court denied the 
motion and reaffirmed its prior opinion denying Columbia’s 
right of eminent domain. 
 
 Columbia challenges the District Court’s orders 
relating to the motions for summary judgment, the motions to 
alter, and the motions for preliminary injunctions. We address 
each matter in turn below.  
 
 
 
 
 
II. Discussion9 
 
 A. The Motions for Summary Judgment 
 
 “Our review of the grant or denial of summary 
judgment is plenary, and we apply the same standard as the 
district court.” Mylan Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 723 
                                              
9 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
and the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h).  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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F.3d 413, 418 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate where “drawing 
all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 
Lexington Ins. Co. v. W. Pa. Hosp., 423 F.3d 318, 322 n.2 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). In reviewing 
cross-motions for summary judgment, we view the facts 
contained in each motion in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party. Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56, 65 (3d 
Cir. 2014).  
 
 We will reverse the District Court’s orders granting the 
Landowners’ motions for summary judgment and denying 
Columbia’s motions for partial summary judgment because 
the Court erred in reading an adjacency requirement into the 
provision regarding replacement pipelines in Part 157 of 
FERC’s regulations. The regulations are unambiguous. 
Section 157.202(b)(2)(i) defines an “eligible facility” as 
including “main line, lateral, and compressor replacements 
that do not qualify under § 2.55(b) of this chapter because 
they will result in an incidental increase in the capacity of 
main line facilities, or because they will not satisfy the 
location or work space requirements of § 2.55(b).” Section 
2.55(b) covers replacement facilities that “will be located in 
the same right of way or on the same site as the facilities 
being replaced, and will be constructed using the temporary 
work space used to construct the original facility.” Therefore, 
a mainline replacement, as in the case of Line 1655, is an 
eligible facility under Part 157 and covered under Columbia’s 
certificate, by definition, because it involves construction 
outside of the existing right of way.  
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 The District Court erred in adopting its own definition 
of “replace” as meaning putting something back in the same 
place. The meaning of “replace,” as commonly understood, is 
not so limited. One replaces electrical wiring in a house, for 
example, by removing worn out or obsolete wires and putting 
in new ones, even if the new wires are routed differently from 
the original wires.  The District Court, and the Dissent, omit 
the most relevant definitions of the word “replace”:  
 
2: to take the place of : serve as a substitute or 
successor of : succeed, supplant  <the saw and sawmill 
rapidly replaced the ax . . .> 
 . . . 
4: to fill the place of : supply an equivalent for < a 
broken toy should not be immediately replaced . . .> 
 
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1925 (3d ed. 
1993). Put simply, in common parlance, “replace” can mean 
to substitute for, or it can mean to literally re-place, to put 
back in the same position. Because the regulations here 
concern replacing old pipeline, i.e., substituting new for old, 
the former definition is the only appropriate one. That 
definition of replace, to provide an equivalent or substitute, 
contains no inherent adjacency requirement. Accordingly, the 
District Court’s and the Dissent’s, reading injects ambiguity 
into the regulation where none exists.  The District Court 
should have ended its analysis by concluding that the 
regulations unambiguously permitted Columbia to complete 
the replacement of Line 1655 outside the existing right of 
way with its existing FERC certificate. 
 
The District Court and our dissenting colleague would 
have a replacement not be a replacement, but rather a 
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“relocation” if constructed in a different place than the 
original pipeline.  But how can this square with Section 
157.202(b)(2)(i), which allows for “replacements” outside the 
existing right of way, so long as the gas company holds a 
blanket certificate of public convenience and necessity? 
 
 More importantly, however, the definition of “replace” 
put forward by the District Court, and now described as the 
“better reading” by our dissenting colleague, (Dissent Op. at 
9), is simply incompatible with the statutory scheme and 
therefore not a reasonable interpretation of the word’s 
meaning in this context. The Dissent agrees with the District 
Court in concluding that the word “replace” should be read in 
the regulation to mean, to “restore to a former place, position, 
or condition.” (Dissent Op. at 8). Finding this definition to be 
favorable, the Dissent argues that “[t]he fact that there are at 
least two ways of understanding the word ‘replacement’ 
shows that it is ambiguous . . . .” (Dissent Op. at 11.) In fact 
there is no ambiguity because the definition proposed by the 
Dissent is inapplicable here for two reasons.  
 
  First, as noted above, using the definition of “replace” 
supplied by the Dissent would render portions of the statute 
nonsensical. Even the Dissent notes that, “sound principles of 
interpretation ‘dictate that a regulatory scheme should be read 
as a whole, so that effect is given to all its provisions.’” 
(Dissent Op. at 7.). (quoting Cumberland Coal Res., LP v. 
Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 515 F.3d 247, 
254 (3d Cir. 2008). In determining whether a statute is 
ambiguous, we: 
 
account for both the “specific context in which . . . 
language is used” and “the broader context of the 
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statute as a whole.” A statutory “provision that may 
seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the 
remainder of the statutory scheme . . . because only 
one of the permissible meanings produces a 
substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the 
law.” 
 
Utility Air Regulatory Group v. E.P.A., 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442 
(2014).  If “replace” were limited to restoring to a former 
place or position, why would Section 2.55(b) specify that it 
applies only to replacements “located in the same right-of-
way or on the same site as the facilities being replaced”? 
Similarly, Section 157.202(b)(2)(i) defines an “eligible 
facility,” inter alia, as a replacement that “will not satisfy the 
location or work space requirements of § 2.55(b),” that is, a 
replacement that is situated outside the position of the 
previous pipeline.  This conclusively proves that the plain 
meaning of replace in this context is not to restore to a former 
place or position.   
 
If we were to apply the Dissent’s suggested definition 
of the word “replace” to the regulation, the result would be 
absurd–a replacement could never occur under Part 157 in the 
situation contemplated. Where a replacement facility cannot 
be “located in the same right-of-way or on the same site as 
the facilities being replaced,” 18 C.F.R. § 2.55(b), it clearly 
cannot take the former place or position of the replaced 
facility. Finally, the Dissent’s definition would contravene 
Section 157.202(b)(ii)(B), which states that an “Eligible 
facility does not include . . . [a]n extension of a main line, 
except replacement facilities covered under § 
157.202(b)(2)(i).” Thus, far from requiring replacements to 
take the place of the old pipeline, the regulations explicitly 
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recognize that replacement pipelines may properly result in 
extensions of a main line.10  
 
Second, a clear understanding of the definition adopted 
by the District Court and the Dissent shows its inapplicability 
to the statutory context here.  To “restore” an object to a 
“former place,” (Dissent Op. at 8) necessarily implies that the 
object previously occupied a certain position, and that same 
object is being returned to that position.  Another way to 
understand this definition is by considering “replace” to mean 
literally “re-place,” whereby an object is removed, possibly 
modified, and returned to its original location. For instance: 
“after dusting the vase, she replaced it on the shelf” 11; 
“[r]eplace your boots on your bare feet, and paddle across 
waterway with well-protected feet”12; “replaced the card in 
the file.”13   
                                              
10 Perhaps recognizing these points, the Dissent argues that it 
is not claiming that the pipeline must be replaced in “exactly 
the same spot.” (Dissent Op. at 9.)  This contradicts its chosen 
definition, however. One cannot both claim that replace 
means to restore to the same place or position, and that it 
means to install in a different place or position.  And once one 
acknowledges that a replacement, i.e. substitute, might well 
occupy a different location from the thing it has replaced, as 
we well agree, there is no inherent limit in the word “replace” 
as to where a replacement may be situated. 
11 Replace, Cambridge Dictionaries Online, 
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/ american-
english/replace (last visited September 12, 2014). 
12 Replace, Oxford English Dictionary, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/162819?rskey= 
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In other words, an object is placed back in its former 
location.14  One cannot place back something which never 
was placed in that position to begin with. Thus, the Dissent’s 
definition necessarily allows Columbia only to place the same 
pipeline back again in its former location. Accordingly if 
Columbia installed a new pipeline as part of a replacement 
project, even in the original right of way, it would 
automatically be in violation of the certificate, because it 
would not be “replacing” a pipeline back to its original site, 
i.e., it would not be “restoring” any pipe to its “former” 
position. Thus, the definition favored by the District Court 
and Dissent  is so stringent as to be absurd and cannot govern 
here.15   
 
  The District Court also erred in relying on FERC’s 
post-9/11 notice of proposed rulemaking, as requiring that 
                                                                                                     
BbM3iQ&result=2&isAdvanced=false (last visited 
September 12, 2014)). 
13 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1925 (3rd 
ed. 1993). 
14 While the Dissent accuses us of “cherry-pick[ing]” these 
examples, we cite them  simply as representative uses of the 
word “replace” when used in the sense of restoring to a 
former place. (Dissent Op. at 9 n.6.)  If there is another way 
of employing the word in this context, we have not 
encountered it and the Dissent does not supply it.  
15 Instead, “replace” in the broad sense of “to furnish an 
equivalent or substitute” controls “especially” in the case 
when referring to something that “has been lost, depleted, 
worn out, or discharged . . . .” American Heritage Dictionary 
of the English Language 1479 (4th ed. 2009). 
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replacements must be adjacent to replaced pipelines. This 
notice concerned the previously unaddressed situation of the 
restoration of gas service in the aftermath of a disaster. A 
close examination of the language of the notice makes 
manifest the error of relying on it as imposing or confirming 
an “adjacency” requirement in the law.  For example, it states 
that replacement facilities contemplated under Part 157 would 
be “outside, but presumably adjacent to, an existing right of 
way.” Emergency Reconstruction of Interstate Natural Gas 
Facilities Under the Natural Gas Act, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4122 
(emphasis added). There is nothing controversial or new in 
this statement. A replacement pipeline would “presumably” 
be adjacent to an existing pipeline for a number of practical 
reasons – cost, environmental permitting limitations, capacity 
requirements, and convenience. This does not mean, however, 
that a replacement pipeline is required to be adjacent to an 
existing right of way.  The other sentence noted by the 
Dissent is similarly inconclusive: “[t]hese regulations, 
however, do not appear to contemplate mainline construction 
over an entirely different route as may be necessary to 
circumvent the site of a disaster . . . .” Id. (emphasis added).  
Again this is dicta, but even more it states the obvious: 
regulations that speak to replacing “physically deteriorated or 
obsolete” pipeline indeed might not be viewed as 
“contemplating” completely changing the location of a totally 
obliterated pipeline to circumvent a disaster.16  Nowhere does 
                                              
16 The notice dealt specifically with emergencies such as a 
“sudden unanticipated loss of natural gas or capacity,” not 
deteriorating pipelines.  68 Fed. Reg. at 4120.  Presumably 
FERC wanted to make clear that whether existing lines were 
rendered inoperable or were totally destroyed due to a 
disaster, re-routing was permissible.  One cannot fault FERC 
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the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking state that replacement 
pipelines, in a non-emergency context, must be located 
adjacent to the original right of way.17  
                                                                                                     
for wanting to cover all bases in such a situation, lest 
someone contend that “replacement” in the existing 
regulations applied only to the routine replacement of 
pipelines that “have or will soon become physically 
deteriorated or obsolete . . . .” 18 C.F.R. § 2.55(b)(1). 
17 Indeed, FERC did not impose an adjacency requirement in 
adopting that portion of Section 157.202(b)(2)(i) which 
allows replacement construction outside the original right of 
way.  In the relevant Final Rule, several comments had 
“argue[d] that replacements not in the same ROW [right of 
way] should be covered under the blanket certificate instead 
of requiring a separate §7(c) application.” Revision of 
Existing Regulations Governing the Filing of Applications for 
the Construction and Operation of Facilities To Provide 
Service or To Abandon Facilities or Service Under Section 7 
of the Natural Gas Act, 64 Fed. Reg. 26572, 26580 (May 14, 
1999) (codified at 18 CFR 157).  Accordingly, one such 
comment proposed the clause that was subsequently codified, 
allowing construction outside the previous right of way.  
FERC thus agreed with the comments, stating broadly that: 
“We intend to allow replacement facilities that do not qualify 
under §2.55(b) because of land requirements to be eligible 
facilities that can be constructed under §157.208 of the 
blanket certificate. Further, to the extent that pipelines require 
more ROW than is provided for in appendix A to part 2 for 
replacement projects, including those not in the original 
footprint, such as river crossings, etc., those replacements 
would qualify as eligible facilities under our proposal.” Id. 
The only caveats noted by FERC were that such replacements 
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The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, in any event, is 
entirely consistent with the plain text of the regulations, 
authorizing replacements by certificate-holders outside the 
right of way without any explicit adjacency requirement. 
Indeed, the Final Rule established that FERC views its 
regulation the same way.  Accordingly, we need not even 
consider principles of deference where the regulation is 
unambiguous.  See Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 
588 (2000) (“Auer deference is warranted only when the 
language of the regulation is ambiguous.”)  The regulation 
speaks for itself, such that Columbia is entitled to the 
easements necessary to complete the replacement of Line 
1655.  The District Court erred in concluding otherwise. 
 
For its part, the Dissent contends that (1) the 
regulations are ambiguous because of the different possible 
meanings of “replace”, (2) the Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking is “plainly in opposition” to the Final Rule, and 
(3) therefore the Final Rule is not entitled to Auer deference.  
(Dissent Op. at 20); Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham 
Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2166 (2012) (noting that Auer 
deference may not be appropriate where an  “agency’s 
interpretation conflicts with a prior interpretation . . . .”)  
Even putting aside the fact that the meaning of “replace” is 
unambiguous, as noted above, the caveats, vague language, 
and highly specific nature of the situation dealt with in the 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking establish that there is no 
conflict with the Final Rule.  Further, the Final Rule itself 
recognizes, and perfectly harmonizes with, the language of 
the previous Notice: “[w]hile the Commission has indicated 
                                                                                                     
were subject to environmental restrictions and landowner 
notice provisions. 
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previously that it is contemplated that replacement facilities 
constructed under blanket authority would usually be located 
adjacent to, if not within, an existing right of way, sections 
157.202(b)(2)(1) and 157.210 permit the construction of non-
main line facilities and main line facilities, respectively, 
without restriction on their location.”  78 Fed. Reg. at 72805 
n.78 (emphasis added).   
 
Even if we were to assume that the regulations are 
ambiguous, the interpretation of the Final Rule would still 
control.  That is because the Final Rule is fully consistent 
with the Notice, and, as an agency interpretation of its own 
regulation, it is deserving of deference.  Decker v. Nw. Envtl. 
Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1337 (2013) (“It is well established 
that an agency’s interpretation need not be the only possible 
reading of a regulation—or even the best one—to prevail. 
When an agency interprets its own regulation, the Court, as a 
general rule, defers to it unless that interpretation is plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”) (internal 
quotations omitted).  Thus, even if we accepted the Dissent’s 
purported ambiguity in the regulations, FERC’s interpretation 
in the Final Rule should control, and Columbia would remain 
entitled to the sought easements. 
 
The Dissent also claims that the Final Rule is simply a 
“post hoc rationalization” on the part of FERC, and therefore 
not deserving of Auer deference. (Dissent Op. at 17.)  We 
acknowledge that Auer deference may not be appropriate 
where an interpretation constitutes a “‘post hoc 
rationalizatio[n]’ advanced by an agency seeking to defend 
past agency action against attack.”  Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 
2166 (emphasis added).  But in this case, there is no past 
agency action that FERC is seeking to defend.  Columbia 
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simply replaced its pipeline under its blanket certificate 
outside the original right of way, and FERC later made clear 
in the Final Rule that Columbia had the authority under the 
applicable regulations to do so.  FERC is not a party to this 
action, nor does it have any reason to favor Columbia’s 
interpretation over the Landowners’, but, we submit, only 
desires to make clear what the regulations provide.  The Final 
Rule accordingly should not be read as any type of post-hoc 
rationalization. 
 
In the end, the Dissent’s reading appears to be aimed 
primarily at avoiding what it perceives to be constitutional 
problems, namely “a grant of limitless authority.” (Dissent 
Op. at 32.) As set forth above, blanket certificate-holders do 
not possess unfettered discretion to replace pipeline.  They 
are constrained by cost limitations, here waived by FERC 
because of Columbia’s good faith attempts at compliance, as 
well as notice requirements and environmental impact.18  
Further, replacements may not be installed simply because a 
company wishes to increase a pipeline’s capacity. Rather, 
such projects may only be undertaken for “sound engineering 
purposes.”  18 C.F.R. § 157.202(b)(2)(i).  Appellees do not 
claim that the replacement project was undertaken for 
anything other than “sound engineering purposes.” Further, 
even if constitutional issues might be implicated in a facial 
challenge, that would be an issue for another case, but that is 
not this case. We note that this constitutional argument was 
                                              
18And, Columbia would appear to be constrained in replacing 
outside the existing right of way by the extra costs of doing 
so, including costs of negotiation and or litigation with 
landowners. 
31 
 
never raised by Appellees, has not been briefed, and therefore 
is not properly before us. 
 
  Lastly, the Landowners argue that the “miscellaneous 
rearrangement” provision of Part 157 limits Columbia’s 
ability to replace the pipeline. This is incorrect. 
“Miscellaneous rearrangement” is defined, in part, as “any 
rearrangement of a facility, excluding underground storage 
injection/withdrawal wells, that does not result in any change 
of service rendered by means of the facilities involved, 
including changes in existing field operations or relocation of 
existing facilities.” 18 C.F.R. § 157.202(b)(6). The 
Landowners claim that such a relocation may only take place 
“[o]n the same property.” Id. § 157.202(b)(6)(i). As the 
District Court noted, however, Section 157.202(b)(6) lists the 
“three characteristics of ‘miscellaneous rearrangements’ in 
the disjunctive.” (App. 37.) Thus a relocation may take place 
on the same property, or it could occur, inter alia, “[w]hen 
required by . . . encroachment of residential, commercial, or 
industrial areas.” Id. § 157.202(b)(6)(ii).  
 
 But this is beside the point. The fact that the 
“miscellaneous rearrangement” provision contemplates a 
scenario in which a pipeline must be “relocated” due to 
encroaching residential developments actually only goes to 
show that this is referring to a relocation, and not a 
replacement. Thus, “relocation,” as used here, involves 
moving an existing entity to a new location, whereas 
“replacement” would involve a substitution of new for old. 
Accordingly, Section 157.208(a) treats “miscellaneous 
rearrangements” as something different from “replacements” 
of eligible facilities. Here, Columbia does not seek to move 
the existing pipeline to a new location. Rather, Columbia will 
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construct a new facility to serve in place of the deteriorating 
one. Thus, as Columbia argues, it is replacing Line 1655, not 
relocating it.19   
 
 Under the plain language of FERC’s regulations, 
Columbia is automatically authorized to replace Line 1655 
according to its proposed plan. Pursuant to its FERC 
Certificate, Columbia has the right of eminent domain over 
the easements that it seeks from the Landowners.  
Accordingly, we will reverse the orders of the District Court  
granting the Landowners’ motions for summary judgment and 
denying Columbia’s motions for partial summary judgment.20 
   
 B. Motions for Immediate Possession 
 
 Columbia argues that we should grant it immediate 
possession of the easements by entering preliminary 
injunctions. It urges that further delay will be harmful to it 
and the public. If it is not able to begin replacement of Line 
1655 until the determination of just compensation, the timely 
completion of the project will be jeopardized. The District 
                                              
19 The Landowners, in their brief, argued that Columbia seeks 
an “extension” of its pipeline requiring it to acquire a new 
certificate authorizing the project, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 
717f(c)(1)(A). (Landowners’ Br. at 11.) At oral argument, 
however, the Landowners conceded that Columbia does not 
seek an extension of its pipeline. We therefore do not address 
this argument.  
20 Having determined that the District Court erred in its 
disposition of the motions for summary judgment, we will 
dismiss the appeal of the Court’s judgment on the motions to 
alter as moot. 
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Court’s ruling that Columbia had not established the right to 
condemn the necessary easements obviously doomed 
Columbia’s request. Given our ruling that recognizes 
Columbia’s right of eminent domain, the issue of the 
preliminary injunction is properly before us. We believe that 
we can easily decide this issue in the first instance, such that 
remand, with its attendant delay, is unnecessary. This is not a 
“normal” preliminary injunction, where the merits await 
another day. In those situations, the probability of success is 
not a certainty such that weighing the other factors is 
paramount. Here, there is no remaining merits issue; we have 
ruled that Columbia has the right to the easements by eminent 
domain. The only issue is the amount of compensation—
which will definitely be determined on remand, but the result 
of which can have no affect on Columbia’s rights to the 
easements. That Columbia’s entitlement to relief comes in the 
form of injunctive relief should not dictate that we impose 
similar constraints on our grant of that relief in this context.  
Nonetheless for the sake of completeness and because the 
District Court and Dissent seek to limit Columbia’s 
entitlement we will examine the other factors. We believe 
they weigh in favor of granting the preliminary injunctions to 
which Columbia is entitled.    
 
  In determining whether a party is entitled to a 
preliminary injunction, we normally consider four factors: 
“(1) whether the movant has shown a reasonable probability 
of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant will be 
irreparably injured by denial of the relief; (3) whether 
granting preliminary relief will result in even greater harm to 
the nonmoving party; and (4) whether granting preliminary 
relief will be in the public interest.” Am. Express Travel 
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Related Servs. v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d 359, 366 (3d Cir. 
2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
 Having already determined that Columbia has 
succeeded on the merits, we now examine whether Columbia 
will suffer irreparable injury if it is denied relief. Columbia 
explains that pipeline construction season is relatively short 
and late to begin — the weather from November through 
February generally makes construction impractical and 
expensive.21 Columbia states that if construction on the 
properties does not begin by now (actually September 1, 
2014), weather events could have a significant disruptive 
effect and potentially delay the replacement of the pipeline 
until 2015. Columbia explains that there are safety concerns 
associated with an aging, unreliable pipeline, and that delay in 
possession of the easements will likely cause it to miss the in-
service deadline in time for the beginning of the heating 
season on November 1, 2014. If Columbia misses the in-
service deadline, it will lose the right to seek reimbursement 
from its customers. Thus the harm to Columbia appears to 
involve its safety, reputation, and economic interests.  
 
 Columbia points to the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in 
East Tennessee Natural Gas Company v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808 
                                              
21 Columbia has submitted two affidavits in support of its 
motions for immediate possession–the affidavit of Doug 
Holley (former Manager of Asset Management for Columbia 
Gas and current Vice President of Projects for Contract Land 
Staff, which was hired by Columbia Gas to assist it in 
acquiring the easements for Line 1655) and the affidavit of 
Jacob Frederick (Manager of Project Management for 
Columbia Gas).  
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(4th Cir. 2004), in arguing that a preliminary injunction is 
warranted where a delay in construction of a pipeline would 
cause “significant financial harm” to both a gas company and 
its customers. Id. at 828-29. The Fourth Circuit explained that 
East Tennessee Natural Gas Company would be forced to 
breach certain contractual obligations if it were forced to 
delay construction in order to hold hearings on just 
compensation. Id. The Landowners argue that Sage is 
inapposite because Columbia has not shown that it will lose 
more than $5 million (which was the estimated loss in Sage). 
The Landowners also point to Third Circuit precedent stating 
that  “a purely economic injury, compensable in money, 
cannot satisfy the irreparable injury requirement,” except 
where “the potential economic loss is so great as to threaten 
the existence of the movant’s business.” Minard Run Oil Co. 
v. United States Forest Serv., 670 F.3d 236, 255 (3d Cir. 
2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although Columbia 
has not cited a specific dollar amount for the financial harm it 
faces were we to deny relief, the harm alleged is not one of 
“purely economic injury.” Here, there are also safety and 
potential liability concerns caused by an inability to meet the 
heating deadline.  
 
 Moreover, the harm to the Landowners that will result 
if we grant Columbia’s preliminary injunctions is minimal. 
Since we have already determined that Columbia has the right 
of eminent domain, it is a certainty that the requested 
easements will be granted. The Fifth Amendment also 
guarantees that the Landowners will be justly compensated. 
The Landowners have not stated any concrete injury other 
than the loss of the easements over their land, which will 
definitely occur, whether or not we grant Columbia 
immediate possession of the easements.  
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 Finally, we examine the public interest involved in 
Columbia’s obtaining relief – it is this factor that 
overwhelmingly weighs in favor of granting Columbia’s 
preliminary injunctions. The Landowners state, summarily, 
that “while the public does have an interest in the pipeline 
being replaced for safety reasons, an additional delay in 
replacement of Line 1655 will not result in any substantial 
harm to the public.” Landowners’ Br. 35. Columbia has 
explained, however, that the safety risks associated with a 
delay in the replacement work and acquisition of the 
easements will increase daily. In his affidavit, Jacob 
Frederick elaborated upon the safety risks: “the Pipeline may 
fail, collapse, explode, or leak, causing bodily and property 
injury or death and/or leaving the residents of York County 
without gas service.” (Frederick Aff. 3.) In addition to these 
safety concerns, Columbia has made it clear that the residents 
of York County could possibly be without heat the entire 
winter if construction of the replacement does not begin soon.  
 
 Weighing all of the relevant factors, we conclude that 
Columbia is entitled to injunctive relief and therefore will be 
granted immediate possession of the easements.  
 
III. Conclusion 
 
 In sum, we will reverse the orders of the District Court 
(1) granting the Landowners’ motions for summary judgment, 
and (2) denying Columbia’s motions for partial summary 
judgment and for preliminary injunctions. We will dismiss the 
appeal of the order concerning the motions to alter as moot. 
Finally, we will remand to the District Court to enter the 
preliminary injunctions and conduct further proceedings.   
  
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting  
The Majority interprets the pertinent regulations to 
unambiguously allow private gas companies to replace a 
pipeline anywhere, on anybody’s property, without any type 
of formal administrative review.  In deciding that the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) has extended such 
a broad grant of the sovereign power of eminent domain to 
private companies, the Majority relies on a definition of 
“replacement” not provided in the text of the regulations but 
supplied by Columbia, even though it is at odds with what 
Columbia admits is the common understanding of what 
constitutes a “replacement” and despite the fact that FERC 
had never adopted that definition until, in the middle of an 
unrelated rulemaking, the agency crafted a footnote in 
reaction to the District Court’s decision in this case.  In my 
view, the Majority’s limitless reading of the regulations is 
deeply problematic and renders them constitutionally suspect.  
To avoid logical difficulties within the regulations, as well as 
to avoid constitutional concerns, some sort of locational 
limitation must serve as a constraint on pipeline replacement 
outside of an original right-of-way.   
 
I agree with the District Court that the regulations are 
ambiguous and therefore resort to FERC interpretations is in 
order.  But FERC has been inconsistent in its explanations of 
the regulations, and the agency’s most recent interpretation 
does not warrant deference.  FERC’s previous interpretation, 
before it issued its footnoted reaction, reasonably indicated 
that there is indeed a locational limitation on pipeline 
replacements outside of an original right-of-way.  Because the 
pipeline project at issue here does not adhere to any locational 
limitation at all, it is not a “replacement” within the meaning 
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of that term in the regulations.  As a consequence, Columbia 
should be required to petition FERC for a new certificate of 
public convenience and necessity before being permitted to 
condemn easements on property previously unaffected by 
Columbia’s pipeline.  I therefore respectfully dissent.       
 
I.   Background 
 
On January 7, 1983, Columbia obtained a blanket 
certificate of public convenience and necessity (the 
“Certificate”) that authorized the company to construct and 
operate a natural gas pipeline, known as “Line 1655,” at the 
location specified in the application.  The Certificate 
continues to authorize the company to engage in limited, 
routine activities with regard to that main-line facility, as 
expressly identified in FERC regulations.  But, “[f]or other 
categories of activities, which may potentially require more 
scrutiny and opportunity for public participation,” the 
Certificate calls for the company to submit to further 
regulatory procedures.  (App. at 104 (footnote omitted).)  
Columbia now seeks to use its decades-old Certificate to 
construct a “replacement” pipeline “up to a mile away” from 
the original Line 1655 and on the lawns of the homes of 
Dwayne and Ann Brown, Bradley and Elizabeth Herr, Myron 
and Mary Jo Herr, and Douglas and Tessa Hilyard 
(collectively, the “Landowners”).  (Appellee’s Br. at 7.)     
 
Columbia attempted at first to negotiate easements 
across the Landowners’ properties but was refused.  It warned 
the Landowners that the offers it had made “do[] not 
represent Columbia’s view of the impact of the project on the 
fair market value [of the properties].  To the contrary, 
Columbia believes that the impact on fair market value will 
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be much less … .”  (App. at 277, 301, 342, 379.)  If the 
Landowners declined Columbia’s initial offers, it threatened, 
“Columbia w[ould] pursue the alternate acquisition process 
provided to natural gas companies by the Natural Gas Act.”  
(App. at 278, 302, 343, 380.)  In other words, interpreting its 
thirty-year-old Certificate to be a blank check for land 
condemnation, Columbia negotiated with an implicit threat: 
take our offers now or forfeit your property rights later, for 
considerably less money, in a condemnation proceeding.1  
After the Landowners maintained their rejection of 
Columbia’s offers, the company sought to make good on that 
threat by filing the eminent domain suit now on appeal.  
 
The District Court granted the Landowners’ motions 
for summary judgment on the question of Columbia’s 
asserted right to the easements.  In denying Columbia’s 
motion for partial summary judgment on the same issue, the 
District Court held that “the project is not automatically 
authorized as a ‘replace[ment]’ of an ‘eligible facility’ 
pursuant to 18 C.F.R. §§ 157.202(b)(2)(i) & 157.208(a).”  
(App. at 35.)  Columbia petitioned to alter or amend the 
judgment, which was denied.  The Court observed that 
“[Columbia]’s attack does not point to an actual error in 
reasoning behind the Court’s judgment.  Instead, Columbia 
                                              
1 The Majority labels this a “sensationalist reading of 
Columbia’s statement” that “has no basis in the record.”  
(Maj. Op. at 7 n.3)  I will leave it to the readers of our 
competing opinions in this case to determine who may be 
indulging in the more extravagant language.  Suffice it to say 
here that, in the language quoted above, there is a basis for 
the observation that Columbia negotiated with the threat of 
condemning the easements for less than the earlier offers.   
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… asserts that the Court should wholly defer to an agency 
interpretation that – according to precedent that Columbia … 
ignores – is properly due very little deference, if any beyond 
its power to persuade.”  (App. at 56.)  The Court’s reference 
to “an agency interpretation” is to FERC’s “about-face” (App. 
at 54), discussed below, on whether a locational limitation 
restricts where a “replacement” pipeline can be put.   
 
II.   Discussion 
 
Until recently, Columbia would not have been able to 
construct pipeline on a new route, as they are attempting to do 
in the proposed Line 1655 project, without seeking a new 
certificate of public convenience and necessity associated 
with the new right-of-way.  At least not according to FERC.  
In 2003, that agency issued a notice entitled Emergency 
Reconstruction of Interstate Natural Gas Facilities Under the 
Natural Gas Act, 68 Fed. Reg. 4120, 4122 (proposed Jan. 17, 
2003) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 157) (hereinafter 
Emergency Reconstruction Notice or Notice),2 in which it 
discussed at length its then-current interpretation of the 
regulations now in question, particularly Title 18, Part 157 of 
the Code of Federal Regulations, which governs “eligible 
facilities,” 18 C.F.R. § 157.202, .208.  An eligible facility is a 
natural-gas installation, such as a pipeline, eligible for 
alteration, such as replacement, under the original certificate 
                                              
2 Ultimately, FERC promulgated a Final Rule based on 
the Emergency Reconstruction Notice.  Emergency 
Reconstruction of Interstate Natural Gas Facilities Under the 
Natural Gas Act, 68 Fed. Reg. 31,596 (May 18, 2003) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 157) (hereinafter Emergency 
Reconstruction Final Rule). 
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granted for the development of that facility.  18 C.F.R. 
§ 157.202(b)(2).3  FERC apparently saw a shortcoming in the 
regulations, namely that they do not allow companies to 
effectively respond to an emergency that might require a 
pipeline to be moved or new pipeline to be installed on a 
route that varies significantly from the right-of-way 
contemplated in an already-issued certificate.  Id. at 4120-24.  
For example, in the Emergency Reconstruction Notice, FERC 
indicates that § 2.55 of the regulations,4 which governs 
replacement projects within an authorized right-of-way, is 
insufficient to address an emergency situation because it does 
not allow for construction “outside the footprint of existing 
facilities.”  Id. at 4123.   
 
The Notice also says that “[P]art 157 . . . provides [a] 
vehicle for reconstruction of facilities … but this authority is 
… limited.”  Id. at 4121.  It goes on to explain that, “[a]cting 
                                              
3 Section 157.202(b)(2)(i) provides, in relevant part, 
that “eligible facility includes main line, lateral, and 
compressor replacements that do not qualify under § 2.55(b) 
of this chapter because they … will not satisfy the location or 
work space requirements of § 2.55(b).”  18 C.F.R. 
§ 157.202(b)(2)(i).   
 4 Section 2.55(b)(1) excludes from the definition of 
facilities the construction of which requires obtaining a new 
certificate those projects “which constitute the replacement of 
existing facilities that have or will soon become physically 
deteriorated or obsolete, to the extent that replacement is 
deemed advisable, if … [t]he replacement facilities … will be 
located in the same right-of-way or on the same site as the 
facilities being replaced.”  18 C.F.R. § 2.55(b)(1)(ii). 
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under blanket authority, [i.e., the authority under Part 157 
conferred by a certificate,] a pipeline may install new 
facilities on a new right-of-way, which may be acquired 
through the pipeline’s exercise of eminent domain.”  Id.  That 
authority “permit[s] locating a portion of mainline … 
replacement facilities outside, but presumably adjacent to, an 
existing right-of-way … .”  Id. at 4122 (emphasis added).  
FERC further recognized this locational limitation on Part 
157 authority by saying that “[t]hese regulations … do not 
appear to contemplate mainline construction over an entirely 
different route as may be necessary to circumvent the site of a 
disaster if immediate replacement is necessary before the 
original site is again available.”  Id. (emphasis added).   
 
I understand that language to mean, as the District 
Court did, that Part 157 authorizes “replacements” that may 
involve placing a pipeline some minimal distance from its 
original right-of-way but that such a project must indeed 
involve only a very limited deviation from that route.  The 
Majority, at Columbia’s urging, sees the matter quite 
differently.  As Columbia put it in argument before the 
District Court, when it comes to replacements, “[u]nder 157 
there is no location restriction.  There is no proximity 
restriction.”  (App. at 776.)   
 
What there is, in short, is an ambiguity in the use of 
the word “replacement” in the regulations.  See In re Phila. 
Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 304 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating 
that a regulatory provision is ambiguous “where the disputed 
language is reasonably susceptible of different 
interpretations” (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  Despite the Majority’s assertion to the contrary, 
the meaning of that term is not clear, and we are left to 
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dispute whether a pipeline “replacement” outside of an 
original right-of-way includes a locational limitation or is 
instead a concept without physical limits.  That ambiguity is 
the first of two related problems in this case.  The second is 
that the alternative interpretations of the ambiguous 
regulation are not equally innocuous.  The one advocated by 
Columbia and adopted by the Majority raises internal 
inconsistencies and constitutional issues that can and ought to 
be avoided.  I discuss both of those problems in turn.  
 
A.   Ambiguity & Deference 
 
 1.   Ambiguity 
 
The Majority concludes that the regulations are 
unambiguous primarily by relying on the interplay between 
the right-of-way locational limitation in § 2.55(b) and the lack 
of an express locational limitation in the definition of 
“eligible facility” in § 157.202(b)(2)(i).   For two reasons, I 
disagree with the conclusion my colleagues draw from that 
difference.  First, sound principles of interpretation “dictate 
that a regulatory scheme should be read as a whole, so that 
effect is given to all its provisions.”  Cumberland Coal Res., 
LP v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 515 F.3d 
247, 254 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
As described in more detail herein, the Majority’s approach 
fails to do that: it conflates “replacement” and “relocation,” 
even though each has a specific and unique meaning in the 
regulations.  Also, by interpreting the term “replacement” so 
broadly, it undermines § 2.55(b) because it leaves practically 
no limitation for replacement projects outside of an existing 
right-of-way.  Further, it allows gas companies to circumvent 
the important notice and hearing requirements of §§ 157.6 
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and 157.10, which necessitate providing notice to both 
directly and indirectly affected property owners and an 
opportunity to participate in a regulatory hearing regarding 
certificate petitions.5   
 
Second, the phrase “replacements that do not qualify 
under § 2.55(b) … because they … will not satisfy the 
location or work space requirements of § 2.55(b),” 18 C.F.R. 
§ 157.202(b)(2)(i), is ambiguous because Part 157’s use of 
“replacement” is reasonably susceptible to at least two 
different interpretations.  The District Court, relying on the 
dictionary, defined “replace” as “to place again: restore to a 
former place, position, or condition,” which, as the Court 
noted, suggests either no relocation or an insignificant 
relocation.  (App. at 32.)  The Majority, however, disagrees 
with that definition and says that, “[p]ut simply, in common 
parlance, ‘replace’ can mean to substitute for.”  (Maj. Op. at 
21.)  That is one reading of “replace.”  But, although my 
colleagues think their selected definition is the only 
applicable one, another and better reading in this context, 
                                              
5 In this same vein, the Majority claims that a 
significant check on a natural gas company’s power to 
condemn easements under Part 157 for pipeline replacements 
is that the company must have within its possession a blanket 
certificate.  But FERC’s statement that “[a]lmost all interstate 
gas pipelines now hold [P]art 157 blanket certificates that 
permit the automatic construction … of certain ‘eligible 
facilities’” suggests that the Majority’s distinction is in effect 
no distinction at all.  Emergency Reconstruction Final Rule, 
68 Fed. Reg. at 31,598.  
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which involves locational issues, is the one chosen by the 
District Court.6   
 
The Majority’s preferred reading of “replace” leads it 
to declare that applying a location-focused definition of the 
term is “absurd.”  (Id. at 24.)  It asserts that the position taken 
by the District Court and that I am advocating requires the 
replacement pipeline to be in exactly the same spot as the 
original.  That is not so, and ordinary speech is not so rigid, as 
one of the Majority’s own examples indicates: “after dusting 
the vase, she replaced it on the shelf.”  (Id. at 25 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).)  When the vase makes it back onto 
the shelf, it has been replaced there, whether it is an inch or 
two to the left or right of where it had been.  The location for 
the replacement is not a matter of pinpoint accuracy, but there 
is a limit.  No one would describe the action as “replacing” 
the vase if it were put in another room.  The Majority’s 
certitude cannot mask the fundamental problem with its view.  
If the only requirement for a replacement is that it 
“substititut[es] new for old” (Maj. Op. at 21, 32), then a gas 
company may now replace pipeline originally located in 
York, Pennsylvania, anywhere in the United States, from 
                                              
6 The Majority also claims that I would require 
Columbia to use the same pipe in its construction efforts for 
those efforts to be categorized as a “replacement.”  (Maj. Op. 
at 25-26.)  The Majority cherry-picks examples from the 
dictionary and improperly treats the characteristics of those 
suggestions as limitations on the term “replace.”  Nothing in 
what the District Court said or what I am saying has anything 
at all to do with the materials that may be chosen for a 
replacement project.  This case is about where pipes are going 
into the ground, not which pipes are being used.     
 10 
 
Portland to Poughkeepsie, as long as that original pipeline is 
somehow “old” and the replacement pipeline is somehow 
“new.”  Whatever the interpretation of “replace,” that hardly 
seems the correct one, let alone the only plausible one.  As 
the District Court said, that reading “puts an excessively 
expansive gloss on the common meaning of” the word.  (App. 
at 32.)  At the very least, “replacement” is ambiguous in this 
context, and so is the regulatory provision of which that term 
is a part. 
 
Columbia tries to avoid that conclusion by asserting 
that the term “replacement” “has a specific meaning under the 
Code of Federal Regulations” (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 24) 
that is “entirely different … than in everyday parlance” 
(Appellant’s Reply Br. at 7).  In other words, Columbia 
acknowledges that its proposed definition of replacement is 
not the only or even the most common interpretation.  One 
might expect that, since Columbia and the Majority are 
rejecting “everyday parlance,” their very different 
understanding of the word “replacement” would be rooted in 
some clear language in the Code of Federal Regulations 
delineating a specialized meaning.  Cf. Rowland v. Cal. Men’s 
Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 200 (1993) (“[C]ourts would hardly 
need direction where Congress had thought to include an 
express, specialized definition for the purpose of a particular 
Act … .”).  But it is not.  The specialized, non-customary 
definition they rely on is nowhere to be found in the 
regulations themselves; nor is it in any agency interpretation 
pre-dating the District Court’s decision.  Instead, in deciding 
that the word is unambiguous, the Majority relies on 
Columbia’s favored definition, which the Majority says is 
dictated by “clear understanding.”  (Maj. Op. at 24.)  Despite 
Columbia’s admission about “everyday parlance” 
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(Appellant’s Reply Br. at 7),  and despite the Majority’s own 
admission that “‘replace’ can mean to substitute for, or it can 
mean … to put back in the same position” (Maj. Op. at 21 
(emphasis added)), the Majority proclaims that the “only 
appropriate” definition is the one “contain[ing] no inherent 
adjacency requirement.”  (Id. at 21-22.)  If assertion were 
argument, that might be more persuasive, but declaring that 
something is unambiguous does not make it so.   
 
Fortunately, we do not, in this administrative-law 
setting, need to choose between different dictionary 
definitions.  The fact that there are at least two ways of 
understanding the word “replacement” shows that it is 
ambiguous, which requires us to consider how FERC has 
interpreted the word.  See Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 
U.S. 576, 588 (2000) (“Auer deference is warranted only 
when the language of the regulation is ambiguous.”).  That 
effort raises its own choices. 
 
2.   Deference 
 
As noted earlier, FERC looked at the issue of 
replacement when it considered the Emergency 
Reconstruction Notice.  Although the Notice is just that – a 
notice of proposed rulemaking – it answered the question of 
whether an additional limiting principle is necessary for 
replacements outside of a right-of-way authorized in a FERC-
granted certificate.  FERC published the Notice for the very 
reason that there was no authority under Part 157 to replace a 
pipeline in a location other than an existing right-of-way or 
“outside, but presumably adjacent to, an existing right-of-
way,” even in an emergency.  Emergency Reconstruction 
Notice, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4122.  FERC itself acknowledged the 
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locational limitation on pipeline replacement, saying the 
regulation “do[es] not appear to contemplate mainline 
construction over an entirely different route as may be 
necessary to circumvent the site of a disaster.”  Id.   
 
For a decade that was the last word on the matter, but 
one should never underestimate the continuing malleability of 
words.  Despite FERC’s well-grounded and plainly stated 
insight about the locational limitations in Part 157, the agency 
made a 180-degree turn one week after the District Court 
issued its opinion in this case and decided that mainline 
construction really is a free-form exercise after all.  In a rule 
published on November 22, 2013, Revisions to Auxiliary 
Installations, Replacement Facilities, and Siting and 
Maintenance Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 72794, 72804 n.78 
(Dec. 4, 2013) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 2, 157, 380) 
(hereinafter Revisions to Auxiliary Installations), FERC 
inserted a footnote designed to “[e]ffectively[] … repudiate[] 
the District Court’s interpretation of the regulation at issue” 
(Maj. Op. at 18).  In that footnote, number 78 to be precise, 
FERC gave what amounts to an on-the-fly approval of the 
Line 1655 project by stating that “the Part 157 blanket 
certificate regulations impose no limitations on the placement 
of the facilities.”  Revisions to Auxiliary Installations, 78 Fed. 
Reg. at 72804 f.78.  This new “Footnote Rule,” as I will refer 
to it for convenience, is directly contrary to the interpretation 
provided in the Emergency Reconstruction Notice.  Id.  The 
question then arises: which FERC interpretation should be 
heeded? 
 
 A choice has to be made because an agency’s 
interpretations of its own ambiguous regulations are, under 
Supreme Court precedent, entitled a degree of deference.  The 
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direction given in Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), is 
that the agency’s interpretation is controlling unless it is 
“plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”7  Id. at 
461 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Nevertheless, in 
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., the Court recently 
cautioned that “this general rule [of deference] does not apply 
in all cases.”  132 S. Ct. 2156, 2166 (2012); see also Harry T. 
Edwards et al., Federal Standards of Review, ch. XIV (“[T]he 
deference afforded an agency’s interpretation of its own 
regulations is significant, but it is not without limits.”).  
Christopher teaches that, once a regulation has been 
determined to be ambiguous, two questions should be 
considered in deciding whether an agency’s new 
interpretation of the ambiguous provision is entitled to Auer 
deference: (1) whether the new interpretation is “plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation,” and (2) 
                                              
7 It bears mentioning that at least three Supreme Court 
justices have indicated an interest in revisiting the holding in 
Auer.  In Decker v. Northwestern Environmental Defense 
Center, 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013), Chief Justice Roberts, joined 
by Justice Alito, concurred in applying deference to an 
agency interpretation, but explained that, even though it 
would have been improper to reconsider Auer in that case 
because the parties did not properly preserve the issue in their 
briefs, the Court should be prepared to do so in a subsequent 
case.  Id. at 1338 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).  Justice Scalia, 
in dissent, noted his discontent with what Auer has become: 
“For decades, and for no good reason, we have been giving 
agencies the authority to say what their rules mean, under the 
harmless-sounding banner of ‘defer[ring] to an agency’s 
interpretation of its own regulations.’”  Id. at 1339 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting).  
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whether the interpretation “reflect[s] the agency’s fair and 
considered judgment on the matter in question.”  Christopher, 
132 S. Ct. at 2166 (internal quotation marks omitted).  An 
interpretation does not reflect fair and considered judgment if, 
for example, it “conflicts with a prior interpretation,” or is 
“nothing more than a convenient litigating position,” or is “a 
post hoc rationalizatio[n] advanced by an agency seeking to 
defend past agency action against attack,” or if deference 
“would seriously undermine the principle that agencies 
should provide regulated parties fair warning of the conduct 
[a regulation] prohibits or requires.”  Id. at 2166-67 
(alterations in original) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
 
 Christopher also expressed a concern that agencies 
may take improper advantage of the deference extended to 
them under Auer: “Our practice of deferring to an agency’s 
interpretation of its own ambiguous regulations undoubtedly 
has important advantages, but this practice also creates a risk 
that agencies will promulgate vague and open-ended 
regulations that they can later interpret as they see fit, thereby 
‘frustrat[ing] the notice and predictability purposes of 
rulemaking.’”  Id. at 2168 (alteration in original) (footnote 
omitted) (quoting Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. 
Ct. 2254, 2266 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring)).   
 
If a court finds that either the “plainly erroneous” or 
“fair and considered judgment” factor cuts against the 
agency’s interpretation, that interpretation is reviewed not 
under Auer, but rather under the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).  See, e.g., 
Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2168-69 (turning to the Skidmore 
standard after concluding that “whatever the general merits of 
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Auer deference, it is unwarranted here”).  Under Skidmore, 
deference is “proper only if the [agency’s view] has the 
power to persuade, which ‘depend[s] upon the thoroughness 
evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, [and] 
its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements.’”  
Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2443 n.4 (2013) 
(second and third alterations in original).  In short, Skidmore 
deference is “a lesser degree of deference” than is given 
under Auer because it considers the interpretation as having at 
most the power to persuade, not the power to control.  
Hagans v. Commn’r of Soc. Sec., 694 F.3d 287, 294-95 
(2012).8   
 
 With that guidance in mind, I turn to the Emergency 
Reconstruction Notice and the Footnote Rule.  The 
interpretation in the Notice acknowledges a much-needed 
constraint on how far a replacement project can stray from an 
original right-of-way.  The Notice instructs that Part 157 does 
not authorize a pipeline replacement that proceeds on an 
entirely new route or is beyond what may fairly be 
characterized as being on or “adjacent” to the original right-
of-way.  If the proposed replacement pipeline does not fall 
within those limitations, the gas company must approach 
FERC for a new certificate.  Nothing about the Notice 
                                              
8 The requirement to consider under Skidmore an 
agency interpretation that has failed the test for Auer 
deference shows just how deeply embedded the idea of 
deference to agencies has become.  If an agency interpretation 
has already been determined to be “plainly erroneous” or 
something less than the product of “fair and considered 
judgment,” it would seem very unlikely to have the power to 
persuade, but the Skidmore base must nonetheless be touched.   
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indicates that the interpretation it provides is plainly 
erroneous or fails to reflect FERC’s fair and considered 
judgment.  It would seem, then, to be guidance of the kind 
suited for Auer deference.   
 
 My colleagues, however, endeavor to downplay the 
importance of the Notice.  They read its statement that Part 
157 “permit[s] locating a portion of mainline[] … 
replacement facilities outside, but presumably adjacent to, an 
existing right-of-way,” Emergency Reconstruction Notice, 68 
Fed. Reg. at 4122, as meaning that, while practical 
considerations will generally prompt gas companies to build 
on the same or an adjacent route, those utilities need not do 
so.  The word that the Majority uses to turn language of 
limitation upside down is “presumably.”  But such heavy 
reliance on that word to undo the express limitation in the 
Notice is misplaced.  In the very next sentence of the Notice, 
FERC made clear that the regulations “do not appear to 
contemplate mainline construction over an entirely different 
route.”  Id.  The Notice thus states and restates the necessary 
principle that should be guiding our instruction to Columbia 
today: if you want to take someone else’s property for your 
pipeline, stay near your right-of-way and do not construct 
along a new route; otherwise, come back for a new certificate. 
 
The Majority deems the advice in the Emergency 
Reconstruction Notice to be irrelevant because it “dealt 
specifically with emergencies such as a ‘sudden unanticipated 
loss of natural gas or capacity,’ not deteriorating pipelines.”  
(Maj. Op. at 27 n.16.)  Although it is true that the Notice 
advocated adoption of certain new regulations focused on 
how to better deal with emergency situations, that does not 
mean that the interpretation it provides of the existing 
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regulations in Part 157 is of no consequence.  The 
interpretation provided in the Notice is very relevant indeed, 
being, as it is, a FERC statement about the meaning of Part 
157 that can rightly be called “just and considered.”  It gives 
guidance on what Part 157 authorizes and what its restrictions 
are, without limiting those restrictions to emergency 
situations.  See Emergency Reconstruction Notice, 68 Fed. 
Reg. at 4122 (“[P]art 157, subpart F, permits replacement 
construction that uses temporary workspace beyond the 
bounds of the temporary workspace previously used to 
construct the original facilities as necessary to install 
replacement facilities.  These regulations also permit locating 
a portion of mainline, lateral, or compressor replacement 
facilities outside, but presumably adjacent to, an existing 
right-of-way where, for whatever reason, the new facilities 
could not be placed entirely within the original facilities’ 
existing right-of-way.” (emphasis added)).  The interpretation 
advanced in the Notice is therefore generally applicable here.  
 
The Footnote Rule, by contrast, is a textbook example 
of an agency shooting from the hip rather than giving a 
question fair and considered judgment.  Despite the 
Majority’s comments to the contrary, FERC’s creation of 
footnote 78 one week after the District Court’s opinion shows 
it to be a hastily arrived-at decision, devoid of the hallmarks 
of an agency interpretation deserving deference.  The timing 
reveals the Footnote Rule as a post hoc rationalization meant 
to defend a past action, in this case Columbia’s attempt to 
obtain property outside of the right-of-way allowed in its 
Certificate.  Cf. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2166 (noting that 
regulatory changes reflecting post hoc rationalization do not 
receive Auer deference).  Moreover, the insertion of the new 
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interpretation in a footnote in the middle of an unrelated rule9 
about auxiliary facilities emphasizes FERC’s eagerness to get 
it out as rapidly as possible, with the aim of undoing the 
District Court’s decision.  Again, that serves to highlight the 
interpretation as a post hoc rationalization of Columbia’s 
asserted condemnation power.  Cf. Martin v. Occupational 
Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 156 (1991) 
(declining to defer to “‘post hoc rationalizations’ … advanced 
for the first time in the reviewing court”).10   
                                              
9 Given that footnote 78 has nothing to do with the 
subject of the Revisions to Auxiliary Installations – which is 
auxiliary facilities, see Revisions to Auxiliary Installations, 78 
Fed. Reg. at 72795 (explaining that the purpose of 
promulgating the revisions is “to clarify” regulations 
governing “auxiliary installations added to existing or 
proposed interstate transmission facilities”) – it is ironic that 
the Majority endeavors to dismiss as mere dicta FERC’s 
comments in the Emergency Reconstruction Notice.  Those 
comments had the merit of being pertinent to the subject of 
the Notice.      
10 Columbia rightly points out that the Supreme Court 
has deferred to after-the-fact interpretations before, 
particularly in an amicus brief filed after the case had reached 
that Court.  See Decker v. Nw. Envt’l Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 
1326, 1337-38 (2013).  But the Supreme Court in Decker 
looked past the post hoc nature of that brief primarily because 
“[t]he agency [in question] has been consistent in its view that 
the types of discharges at issue here do not require … 
permits.”  Id.  Here, however, the Footnote Rule contradicts 
the Emergency Reconstruction Notice’s prior interpretation of 
Part 157.  
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The Majority endeavors to pass off the new 
interpretation in the Footnote Rule as “perfectly 
harmoni[ous]” with what was previously said in the 
Emergency Reconstruction Notice (Maj. Op. at 29), but that 
ignores the warning in the Notice that Part 157 does “not 
appear to contemplate mainline construction over an entirely 
different route as may be necessary to circumvent the site of a 
disaster if immediate replacement is necessary before the 
original site is again available,” Emergency Reconstruction 
Notice, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4122.  Because FERC opined that Part 
157 does not allow new routing for a “replacement” pipeline 
                                                                                                     
The Majority also says that FERC is not “‘seeking to 
defend past agency action against attack’” and thus the 
Footnote Rule cannot be read as a post hoc rationalization.  
(Maj. Op. at 30 (quoting Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2166).)  
But FERC is absolutely justifying its failure to require 
Columbia to obtain a new certificate of merit for proposed 
Line 1655.  Moreover, even if there were no agency decision 
to defend, the analysis is not so limited.  Both the Auer and 
Decker Courts permitted relevant federal agencies to submit 
after-the-fact interpretations in amicus briefs in support of 
another agency’s application of their regulations and not their 
own actions.  See Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1337-38 (EPA 
defending state decision-maker’s determination); Auer, 519 
U.S. at 461 (Secretary of Labor defending members of the St. 
Louis Board of Police Commissioners).  Despite that 
difference, the Supreme Court went on to consider whether 
those interpretations were post hoc rationalizations.  Decker, 
133 S. Ct. at 1337-38; Auer, 519 U.S. at 461.  In this case, 
one could interpret FERC to be likewise defending another’s 
interpretation of its rules; the fact that the interpreter is a 
private company is of no moment.            
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even in the event of an emergency, there is precious little 
logic and no consistency in saying that new routing is 
permitted in the absence of an emergency.  It is thus not 
harmonious to assert, as the Footnote Rule does, that “Part 
157 … regulations impose no limitations on the placement of 
[replacement] facilities.”  Revisions to Auxiliary Installations, 
78 Fed. Reg. at 72804 n.78.  FERC at first interpreted Part 
157 to include a geographic limitation on replacement 
projects.  The Footnote Rule, issued with no notice and within 
a week of the judicial action to which it was a reaction, 
purports to completely do away with that limitation.  The two 
interpretations are plainly in opposition.   
 
FERC itself tacitly admits as much in footnote 78.  It 
says, “[w]hile the Commission has indicated previously that it 
is contemplated that replacement facilities constructed under 
blanket authority[, i.e., pursuant to a FERC-granted 
certificate,] would usually be located adjacent to, if not 
within, an existing right-of-way, [Part 157] permit[s] the 
construction of non-main line facilities and main line 
facilities[] … without restriction on their location.”  Id.  No 
one, not even those in the Majority, can claim that what 
FERC was doing in that passage was saying how consistent 
its newly announced position is with its past statements.  The 
evident purpose in giving a nod to what was said previously 
was to acknowledge but minimize the change in position.  
The while-we-previously-said locution hangs a bell on the 
difference.    
 
That does not alter my colleagues’ approach, though.  
They look to the use of the word  “usually” – a replacement 
will usually be adjacent to or within an existing right-of-way 
– and they conclude that it must mean FERC never really laid 
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down an interpretation that restricts the location of a 
replacement pipeline.  (See Maj. Op. at 29.)  Like the word 
“presumably” in the Notice, however, the word “usually” in 
the Footnote Rule cannot carry the analytical weight the 
Majority puts on it.  Rather than showing there is no rule, 
“usually” and “presumably” are words indicating that there is 
in actuality a standard way of proceeding – a rule, so to speak 
– one to which occasional exceptions may be found but a rule 
nonetheless.  A statement that repudiates what had been the 
rule cannot rightly be labeled as being in harmony with the 
rule.   
 
There is yet another reason to reject footnote 78 as the 
product of fair and considered judgment.  In Christopher, the 
Supreme Court noted that, “where[] …. an agency’s 
announcement of its interpretation is preceded by a very 
lengthy period of conspicuous inaction, the potential for 
unfair surprise is acute.”  132 S. Ct. at 2168.  Here, FERC 
issued the Footnote Rule in November 2013, over a decade 
after it published the Emergency Construction Notice.  
Anyone paying attention would certainly be surprised to find 
that what had been, by the agency’s own interpretation, a 
presumptive limitation on where a pipeline could be replaced 
was suddenly no limitation at all.  Deference to the Footnote 
Rule under such circumstances serves to foster cynicism and 
to subvert the purpose of formal rulemaking.11    
                                              
11 In addition to not being the product of fair and 
considered judgment, the Footnote Rule is plainly erroneous 
because the interpretation renders the relevant regulations 
internally inconsistent and constitutionally infirm, as I will 
discuss further hereafter.    
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FERC’s new interpretation of Part 157 thus ought not 
receive the benefit of Auer deference, and it is no more 
salvageable under Skidmore.  Footnote 78 is unpersuasive for 
all of the points already discussed.  Cf. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. 
Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013) (noting an 
agency’s “explanations lack the persuasive force that is a 
necessary precondition to deference under Skidmore”).  It 
fails to persuade on another ground as well: it is inconsistent 
with Part 157 itself.  If I understand the Majority correctly, 
Columbia’s project can be considered as both a relocation and 
a replacement.  That at least appears to be what Columbia 
believes, as shown in comments before the District Court.  At 
a single hearing, it referred to the proposed Line 1655 
construction interchangeably as a “replacement” and a 
“relocation.”  (Compare App. at 770 (“The pipeline itself is 
an eight inch gas main.  The gas main is going to be 
relocated.”), and App. at 787 (“We are not rerouting.  We are 
relocating … .”), with App. at 775 (“We have the right to 
construct a replacement main that would not qualify under a 
2.55 analysis.”).)   
 
The words “replacement” and “relocation” are not 
intrinsically incompatible as synonyms.  Part 157, though, 
treats them differently, as denoting separate methods of 
authorizing pipeline construction, with different requirements 
applicable to each.  When we examine a statute, “[w]e 
generally seek to respect Congress’ decision to use different 
terms to describe different categories of people or things.”  
Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1708 (2013).  
Our approach in reviewing a regulation should be the same.  
Part 157 defines authorized “replacement” projects as 
follows: “[E]ligible facility includes main line, lateral, and 
compressor replacements that do not qualify under § 2.55(b) 
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[governing work within a certificate-designated right-of-way] 
… because they will … not satisfy the location or work space 
requirements of § 2.55(b).”  18 C.F.R. § 157.202(b)(2)(i) 
(emphasis added).  As for a “relocation” project, the 
regulation couches it not as a replacement but as a 
“miscellaneous rearrangement,” saying, “[m]iscellaneous 
rearrangement of any facility means any rearrangement of a 
facility … including changes in existing field operations or 
relocation of existing facilities … .”  Id. § 157.202(b)(6) 
(emphasis added).  Because “replacement” and “relocation” 
are intended to mean different things in Part 157, an 
interpretation that allows the concept of the former to absorb 
the latter is dubious, but that is what the Majority’s 
interpretation does.  As noted by the District Court and as 
mentioned above, the definition of “replace” advocated by 
Columbia – and now adopted by the Majority – “puts an 
excessively expansive gloss on the common meaning” of that 
word (App. at 32), and thereby improperly allows Columbia 
to “replace” pipeline by constructing new pipeline a mile (or, 
for that matter, any distance) from the original right-of-way.  
When a replacement pipeline can go anywhere, there is no 
need to consider it for “relocation,” and the separate provision 
for relocation is thus made of no effect. 
 
In sum, the Footnote Rule is entitled to neither Auer 
nor Skidmore deference, and the interpretation in the 
Emergency Reconstruction Notice remains the best guidance.  
The District Court did not err in deciding that, because the 
Line 1655 project is neither within nor adjacent to the 
existing right-of-way,12 the project is not a “replacement” 
                                              
12 The District Court noted that this case “does not rise 
and fall based on the definition of adjacency” because it is not 
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under Part 157, Emergency Reconstruction Notice, 68 Fed. 
Reg. at 4122, and thus cannot proceed without an additional 
certificate of public convenience and necessity.     
 
 B.   Constitutional Concerns13 
 
An additional reason to adopt the Emergency 
Reconstruction Notice’s interpretation of Part 157 is that the 
Majority’s interpretation would render the regulations 
constitutionally infirm.  The Majority’s broader interpretation 
of “replacement” inappropriately grants to a private company 
eminent domain power coextensive with that of the state and 
strips future aggrieved landowners of their rights to formal 
                                                                                                     
a close call whether the new route for Line 1655 is adjacent – 
the proposed route is “entirely new.”  (App. at 53 n.1.)   
13 The Majority notes that no constitutional arguments 
were raised in this case.  That may be so, yet “[w]hen an issue 
or claim is properly before the court, the court is not limited 
to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but 
rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the 
proper construction of governing law.”  Kamen v. Kemper 
Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991).  We are attempting 
to understand the meaning of the regulation in question, and I 
am merely applying the canon of constitutional avoidance.  
That canon “is not a method of adjudicating constitutional 
questions”; rather, it “is a tool for choosing between 
competing plausible interpretations of a statutory [or, in this 
case, a regulatory] text.”  Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 
381 (2005).  The aim is to avoid constitutional problems, and 
we are not bound by the parties’ arguments in determining 
which interpretive tools are relevant and how they bear on the 
proper construction of governing law.      
 25 
 
administrative procedures.  An essential canon of 
construction is that, if a court is faced with two possible 
interpretations of a regulation, “by one of which [the 
regulation] would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, 
[the court’s] plain duty is to adopt that which will save the 
[regulation].”  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of 
N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 226 n.8 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting NLRB v. 
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The more limited 
interpretation of “replacement” provided by the Emergency 
Reconstruction Notice should accordingly be applied to 
preserve §§ 157.202 and 157.208 as they relate to main-line 
replacements of eligible facilities.   
 
 The Supreme Court has recognized that there are 
tighter bounds on the exercise of eminent domain by a utility 
company than there are on that power when wielded by the 
sovereign.  In United States v. Carmack, the Court held that 
“[a] distinction exists … in the case of statutes which grant to 
others, such as public utilities, a right to exercise the power of 
eminent domain on behalf of themselves.  These are, in their 
very nature, grants of limited powers.”  329 U.S. 230, 243 
n.13 (1946) (emphasis added); see also Nat’l R.R. Passenger 
Corp. v. Two Parcels of Land, 822 F.2d 1261, 1264-65 (2d 
Cir. 1987) (“Amtrak has not been authorized to exercise the 
sovereign’s power of eminent domain.  It has been granted a 
limited power, within the meaning of United States v. 
Carmack, to condemn land ‘required [for] intercity rail 
passenger service.’” (alteration in original) (citations 
omitted)).  That conclusion makes sense: when the power of 
eminent domain is partially delegated to a private company, 
that delegation must be as limited as possible to protect 
landowners from abusive takings under the Fifth Amendment.   
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 The Majority seems to suggest that a private 
company’s self-interest is a satisfactory limitation on the 
scope of the delegated power to take other people’s property.  
(See Maj. Op. at 26 (“A replacement pipeline would 
‘presumably’ be adjacent to an existing pipeline for … 
practical reasons – cost … and convenience.”); id. at 30-31 
n.18 (“Columbia would appear to be constrained in replacing 
outside the existing right of way by the extra costs of doing 
so, including costs of negotiation and or litigation with 
landowners.”).)  I am a great believer in the power of self-
interest, but it does not serve as a constitutional check.  We 
do not allow the government to condemn people’s land 
without layers of procedural protection in place, and we 
certainly cannot allow a private company to do so simply on 
the assurance that it has reasons to exercise restraint.  Yet an 
unsupervised condemnation power is exactly what Columbia 
claims to have under Part 157.  When asked by the District 
Court if the interpretation Columbia was proposing meant 
that, in pursuing the Line 1655 “replacement” project, the 
company “could construct this line in, say, Lincoln, 
Nebraska,” Columbia’s counsel responded, “On a theoretical 
level you could.”  (App. at 776.)  Counsel then outlined 
“practically” why that would not happen (id.), but that, as I 
will explain, amounts to cold comfort.  “Trust me” is not a 
reassuring response to the question, “What will you do with 
the sovereign’s power?” 
 
 Although Columbia contends that there are no 
locational limitations on replacing a main line under Part 157, 
it points to four things that it says, and the Majority agrees, 
should mollify concerns about giving to a utility the full 
condemnation power of the sovereign without the structural 
and procedural checks that limit the government.  Those four 
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things are monetary restrictions, a notice requirement, an 
environmental-impact-statement requirement, and a reporting 
requirement.  In this case, none of them function as a 
meaningful restraint. 
 
It is true that a “replacement” pipeline can be built 
with less FERC supervision if its cost is below a monetary 
threshold.  In 2013, the year Columbia began work on Line 
1655, that threshold was $11,000,000, and staying below it 
meant that a gas company could avoid providing any formal 
notice or environmental-impact statement to FERC before 
identifying the land on which it planned to build.  18 CFR 
§ 157.208(a)-(b), (d).  Columbia at first projected that its 
costs would be below $11,000,000, so the notice and 
environmental-impact-statement requirements were made 
inapplicable here.  The reporting requirement, meanwhile, is 
merely an annual “check-in” with FERC in which a gas 
company provides some information for each facility 
scheduled for completion that year.  18 C.F.R. § 157.208(e).14  
Therefore, other than the locational limitation now at issue, 
the cost cap was to be the lone constraint on Columbia’s 
construction plans. 
 
 But, in this case, FERC actually waived even the 
$11,000,000 cost cap, thus removing the last restraint on the 
                                              
14 That information includes a “description of the 
facilities,” a listing of the “specific purpose, location, and 
beginning and completion date of construction of the facilities 
installed,” the “actual installed cost,” and descriptions of 
consultations made regarding various environmental 
regulations.  18 C.F.R. § 157.208(e)(1)-(4).   
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company’s exercise of eminent domain.15  With that 
restriction removed, § 157.208 swallows § 2.55(b), for if a 
natural gas company seeks to move its pipeline outside the 
original right-of-way and thus outside of § 2.55(b)’s purview, 
there is really nothing to prevent it from doing so.   
 
The Majority proffers other “curbs” on replacement 
projects, in addition to its misplaced faith in its own 
perception of a gas company’s self-interest.  (Maj. Op. at 11.)  
Those include a requirement that the “ʻprimary purpose’” of 
replacements be for sound engineering purposes – in other 
words, that “ʻthere must be a physical need to replace 
facilities’” and that gas companies may not circumvent 
pipeline requirements merely by designating a project as a 
“ʻreplacement.’”  (Maj. Op. at 11-12 (quoting 18 C.F.R. 
§ 157.202(b)(2)(i); Revision of Existing Regulations Under 
the Natural Gas Act, 64 Fed. Reg. 54522, 54527 (Sept. 29, 
1999) (codified at 18 C.F.R. part 157)).)  My colleagues also 
say that gas companies may not construct new delivery points 
or replace pipeline for the primary purpose of increasing main 
                                              
15 The fact that Columbia conveniently obtained the 
waiver in the middle of the proceedings below suggests that 
FERC did not engage in any substantial deliberation before 
issuing it.  What is more, FERC’s proffered justification for 
the waiver was that the landowners pushed back in 
negotiations, which caused construction to be delayed.  In 
essence, the cost limitation was waived for the precise reason 
it should not be: because property owners questioned the 
exercise of eminent domain.  The waiver sets a troubling 
precedent that punishes property owners for attempting to 
rely on protections afforded them in an eminent domain 
process that the agency is supposed to oversee.  
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line capacity.  And they point out that, if a landowner has a 
problem with a gas company’s use of eminent domain, that 
person may file a complaint with FERC.  But just as 
Columbia’s claimed limitations are insufficient, so are those 
proposed by the Majority.   
 
As for the primary-purpose requirement, because 
FERC does not review projects that are automatically 
authorized, 18 C.F.R. § 157.208(a), as Columbia says is so in 
this instance, there is no independent way to determine what 
the primary purpose of the replacement is.  As for delivery 
points, they have nothing to do with the present dispute – they 
are not pipelines.  As for capacity, I assume my colleagues 
are referring to the provision of that regulation which 
excludes from the definition of “eligible facility” 
“[r]eplacements for the primary purpose of creating additional 
main line capacity.”  18 C.F.R. § 157.202(b)(2)(i).  That 
regulation prohibits gas companies from undertaking a 
replacement for the primary purpose of increasing the gas 
capacity of the pipeline.  Again, though, the regulation as 
interpreted by the Majority would permit a gas company to 
construct pipelines anywhere outside the original right-of-
way and thus does not preserve constitutional protections for 
property owners.  And, finally, as for the option landowners 
have of filing complaints with FERC, it is perverse to foist 
upon the citizenry the obligation of policing those whom the 
government, as agents of the citizenry, are already supposed 
to be policing.   
 
 To repeat, because the cost cap – the only legitimate 
control on Columbia’s “automatic authorization” of its 
exercise of eminent domain – is waivable by FERC and thus 
proves to be an unreliable restraint, the Majority’s 
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interpretation of Part 157 is constitutionally suspect in that it 
permits a delegation of power beyond that which can properly 
be made to a private company.  The District Court 
exaggerated only a little in saying that the interpretation 
proposed by Columbia and since adopted by the Majority 
means that a “certificate automatically authorizes relocation 
of replacement Line 1655 literally anywhere on earth, so long 
as the replacement ‘will not satisfy the location or work space 
requirements of § 2.55(b).’”  (App. at 32.)  That outcome is 
untenable. 
 
The Majority’s ruling presents another constitutional 
problem.  In Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of 
Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915), the Supreme Court 
distinguished the concerns arising from agency actions that 
affect broad swaths of the population and those zeroing in on 
a handful of individuals, noting that the latter were more 
significant.  It made clear that, when agency action affects 
“[a] relatively small number of persons,” those individuals are 
“exceptionally affected.”  Id. at 446.  Such action is 
adjudicative in nature, and property owners are entitled to 
procedural due process above and beyond that which has been 
provided by the legislature via the agency’s organic statute.  
Id.   
 
Consistent with that safeguard, Congress and FERC 
require significant oversight of any construction outside a 
FERC-issued certificate’s right-of-way.  Specifically, the 
Natural Gas Act provides, “[n]o natural-gas company … shall 
… undertake the construction or extension of any facilities 
therefor … unless there is in force with respect to such 
natural-gas company a certificate of public convenience and 
necessity issued by the Commission authorizing such acts or 
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operations.”  15 U.S.C. § 717f(c)(1)(A).  Thus, the 
requirements for obtaining a new certificate apply “in every 
case where a natural gas company acquires additional 
property, even for operation and maintenance purposes.”16  
                                              
16 The Majority characterizes § 717f(c)(1)(A) as only 
being applicable to extensions of already-existing facilities.  
(Maj. Op. at 32 n.19.)  But the statute is not so limited, as it 
applies to “any proposed construction or extension.”  15 
U.S.C. § 717f(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added).  There is no dispute 
that the project constitutes a “construction”; in fact, FERC in 
its Footnote Rule aptly described replacements outside the 
original right-of-way as “construction of … main line 
facilities … without restriction on their location.”  Revisions 
to Auxiliary Installations, 78 Fed. Reg. at 72804 n.75.  
Columbia likewise refers to its replacement project as a 
construction, noting that “[i]f [it] is not able to begin 
construction on the properties by September 1, 2014, weather 
events could have a significant disruptive effect.”  
(Appellant’s Opening Br. at 8, 39.)   
In any event, the distinction between an “extension” 
and “proposed construction” is meaningless in this case 
because the regulatory goal as to both is to place significant 
controls over a natural gas company acquiring additional 
property, no matter the reason.  FERC has promulgated such 
controls for construction, expansion, or any other purpose 
requiring a FERC certificate, “to ensure that landowners will 
be informed of any proposed infringement of their property 
rights, and will have an opportunity to contest such proposed 
infringements, prior to condemnation proceedings.”  
Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline, Co. v. An Exclusive Gas 
Storage Leasehold, 524 F.3d 1090, 1097 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(emphasis added) (citing 18 C.F.R. §§ 157.6(d)(2)(iv), 
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Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Co. v. Exclusive Gas 
Storage Leasehold, 524 F.3d 1090, 1097 (9th Cir. 2008).  A 
“key Congressional goal in enacting the NGA [was] to have 
FERC balance the competing public interests involved in a 
proposed project through the issuance of certificates of public 
convenience and necessity.”  Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e) 
(setting forth factors for FERC to consider in deciding 
whether to issue a FERC certificate).  Notably, FERC has 
interpreted that provision to require detailed notice to affected 
landowners of their rights as to the proposed project and a 
formal hearing where they have an opportunity to intervene 
and protest it.  18 C.F.R. §§ 157.6(d)(2), 157.10.   
 
The Majority manages to turn those limiting 
regulations into a grant of limitless authority to natural gas 
companies for basically the same activity as long as that 
activity is labeled a “replacement.”  The approach adopted 
today allows a gas company to bypass all notice-and-hearing 
requirements by tying its proposed project to the originally 
authorized pipeline, even if that authorization was provided 
decades ago and in an entirely different location.  No 
consideration is given to the rights of newly affected parties.  
That is fundamentally at odds with regulations requiring 
notice and an opportunity to participate in certificate hearings.  
 
It is also at odds with what the Supreme Court has said 
about the searching review FERC is supposed to undertake 
before issuing a certificate: 
 
                                                                                                     
157.6(d)(3)(v), 157.10 (procedures for obtaining a FERC 
certificate)).    
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 [A] natural gas company must obtain from 
FERC a ‘certificate of public convenience and 
necessity’ before it constructs, extends, 
acquires, or operates any facility for the 
transportation or sale of natural gas in interstate 
commerce.  FERC will grant the certificate only 
if it finds the company able and willing to 
undertake the project in compliance with the 
rules and regulations of the federal regulatory 
scheme.   
 
Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 302 (1988) 
(citation omitted).  In short, the Supreme Court has read 
§ 717f(h) of the Natural Gas Act to require gas companies to 
apply for a new certificate prior to engaging in construction 
projects like the one here, as the companies are subject to 
FERC’s “statutory duty” to carefully review any new project 
that “constructs, extends, acquires, or operates any facility for 
the transportation” of natural gas.17  Id.    
 
 FERC, once upon a time, interpreted its regulations to 
require notice and hearings to protect affected landowners’ 
                                              
17 In fact, Columbia concedes that it was free to 
petition FERC for another certificate of public convenience 
and necessity to authorize its current project, but it chose not 
to.  Had it done so, much delay and expense would have been 
avoided here.  But Columbia wants a precedent for the 
exercise of power.  That is unfortunate because, if everything 
is as Columbia claims, the pipeline construction would be 
underway and perhaps completed, the Landowners’ rights 
would have been addressed, and safety issues, to the extent 
there are any, would have been resolved.    
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interests and balance them with the public interest in a safe 
and properly functioning supply of natural gas.18  The 
Majority’s reading of the regulations, while very convenient 
for Columbia and perhaps the public at large, leaves those 
procedural, even constitutional, protections for property 
owners in tatters.19        
                                              
18 The Majority implies that I am standing in the way 
of safety measures.  That is not my position.  I am certainly 
not suggesting that pipes be left to rot in the ground.  A gas 
company can maintain or replace its pipeline on or adjacent to 
its certificate’s designated right-of-way, but if it strays 
beyond that, the regulations and the Constitution bring 
procedural protections into play that require a utility to 
approach FERC for a new certificate.  Notice and an 
opportunity to be heard are basic protections for the property 
rights of American citizens.   
19 The Majority also errs in reversing the District 
Court’s denial of Columbia’s request for a preliminary 
injunction and immediate possession of the easements.  
Because I believe Columbia lacked the authority to condemn 
the easements by the power of eminent domain, as discussed 
above, I would also conclude that Columbia does not have a 
right to immediate possession of the easements.  But even 
assuming Columbia’s success in this case, the speculative 
nature of Columbia’s proffered evidence cuts against an 
injunction.  The testimony of Doug Holley, a former 
employee and current easement-contract negotiator, is 
persuasive.  At the preliminary-injunction hearing below, he 
conceded that he “do[es not] know as an individual [whether 
the line could fail soon] because [he] ha[s] not seen the line, 
[he] ha[s] done no testing on the line, [and he] can’t speak to 
whether there is an immediate danger.  [He is just] assuming 
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III.   Conclusion 
 
Because the Emergency Reconstruction Notice 
provides an interpretation that is not plainly erroneous and 
that reflects a fair and considered judgment concerning limits 
on where a replacement pipeline may be located, we should 
give that interpretation deference.  The District Court did not 
err in understanding that such a limitation is necessary, nor in 
determining that a significant departure from the pipeline’s 
original route exceeds that limit.  Thus, applying basic 
administrative-law principles leads to the conclusion that we 
should be affirming the ruling of the District Court.  Speaking 
more generally, it is disturbing and discouraging that, by 
today’s ruling, the Majority endorses a view of delegated 
sovereign power so broad that a private gas company, with no 
agency oversight or other significant procedural restraint, can 
take the property of other citizens far removed from that 
company’s original right-of-way.  I therefore respectfully 
dissent. 
 
                                                                                                     
there is because [his] company has put into place this 
prioritization system [to determine which line to replace 
next].”  (Preliminary Injunction H’g Trans. at 53:19-24.)  
Columbia proffers no evidence indicating that a threat is 
imminent.  Therefore, based only on the information before 
us, a preliminary injunction is not the proper remedy here.   
 
